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ODIOUS, ILLEGITIMATE, ILLEGAL, OR 
LEGAL DEBTS—WHAT DIFFERENCE 
DOES IT MAKE FOR INTERNATIONAL 




Once upon a time, sovereign debts were just that—debts or the entitlement 
to be repaid fully, including interest. During the 1970s it was thought 
unnecessary to make any distinctions between debts, based on the assumption 
that sovereigns might possibly become illiquid, but could never become 
insolvent. Commercial banks disregarded the most elementary rules of prudent 
banking, including their duty of due diligence as lenders, laboring on the 
assumption that whatever flowed into developing countries would eventually 
flow back with fees and interest. A substantial misallocation of resources 
resulted, both directly within borrowing countries and indirectly by preventing 
otherwise viable investments elsewhere. Commercial banks did not act 
irrationally, though. Convincing evidence exists that they had reason to assume 
that their claims would be protected against the market by governments that are 
members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD).1 Not bothering about economic fundamentals was thus explicable 
and—from a business-administration point of view—rational. 
This cozy understanding that neither legal principles enforced elsewhere nor 
economic facts would affect sovereign debts was supported by the Bretton 
Woods Institutions (BWIs), the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). They 
promoted such attitudes, encouraging developing countries to borrow. Even 
after the debt disaster had been recognized by others, the BWIs continued to 
assert very vocally that financial markets worked, completely failing to realize 
how serious the situation was—that indeed there was a crisis. It took them an 
embarrassingly long time to acknowledge the nature and the dimension of the 
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debt problem, as a host of evidence from their own publications proves. Even 
after Mexico’s default in August 1982, the BWIs thought the money market 
functioned well, seeing no signs of liquidity bottlenecks or of restrictions 
regarding the capital base of private banks limiting lending to sovereign 
developing countries, which was supposed to continue on a large scale.2  
Naturally, after 1982, banks continued to assume all sovereign debts to be 
legitimate, legal, and payable. 
Eventually forced to admit at least a liquidity crisis, the BWIs became the 
most ardent advocates of the “illiquidity theory.” Debt management after 1982 
was based on the assumption that there was no fundamental crisis, only an 
inconvenient but temporary inability to pay. Countries would “grow out of 
debts.” Debt reduction would therefore not be needed. No one saw a need to 
qualify debts because they were expected to be fully repaid. Economist William 
R. Cline, U.S. Treasury Secretary James Baker, as well as the BWIs were firm 
defenders of this thesis. Based on optimistic assumptions—for instance, 
regarding debtors’ export volumes and prices or relatively high growth in 
OECD countries—Cline claimed just before the 1985 IMF–IBRD meeting that 
by the late 1980s, debt–export ratios would be back to levels previously 
associated with creditworthiness. Optimistically, he concluded, “The emerging 
evidence in 1983–84 has tended to confirm the analysis that the debt problem is 
one of illiquidity and subject to improvement as international recovery takes 
place.”3 Public funds poured in, allowing commercial banks to receive higher 
(re)payments than otherwise possible and producing a remarkable change in 
debt structures. It took quite some time to realize that a substantial percentage 
of sovereign debts was indeed unpayable, although the problem had been 
recognized well before August 1982, and insolvency procedures for sovereigns 
were proposed soon after Mexico’s default.4 
It took even longer until standards absolutely usual and mandatory in the 
case of any debtors other than sovereigns were acknowledged, such as checking 
the legal basis of claims. Although Costa Rica had saved almost ten percent of 
interest in arrears by verifying past-due interest claimed by banks loan-by-loan,5 
no need was perceived for systematic and routine checks of the legality of 
claims. The first request that all debts of insolvent sovereigns should be 
routinely assessed, as in the case of all other insolvent debtors, met with 
 
 2. See, e.g., Eugene L. Versluysen, Der Kapitaltransfer in Entwicklungsländer zu 
Marktbedingungen, 19 FINANZIERUNG & ENTWICKLUNG, no. 4, 33 (1982); for more details see 
RAFFER & SINGER, supra note 1, at 165. 
 3. William R. Cline, International Debt: From Crisis to Recovery?, 75 AMERICAN ECON. REV. 
(PAPERS & PROC.) 185, 187 (1985). 
 4. See C. G. Oechsli, Procedural Guidelines for Renegotiating LDC Debts: An Analogy to Chapter 
11 of the US Bankruptcy Reform Act, 21 VA. J. INT’L L. 305, 317–18 (1981) (proposing sovereign 
insolvency well before 1982); see also RAFFER & SINGER, supra note 1, at 163–64. 
 5. Christine A. Bogdanowicz-Bindert, Debt and Development Crisis: The Case of Small- and 
Medium-Sized Debtors, in THE LINGERING DEBT CRISIS 141, 145 (Khadija Haq ed., 1985). 
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disdain.6 It was not considered necessary to verify the legality of claims against 
sovereigns. Even claims that were known to have no legal basis were treated as 
perfectly legal and legitimate debts. According to the IBRD, “governments in 
many of these countries were forced to assume the losses suffered as a result of 
the external debts of private banks and corporations, which further worsened 
the burden on the budget.”7 Neither the BWIs nor creditor governments 
criticized this practice. Although such ex post “socialization” under pressure 
made debt management more difficult, the BWIs and creditor-OECD 
governments insisted on punctual service of these illegal debts as well—all the 
while busily preaching the rule of law to debtors whose basic right to honor 
contracts freely and voluntarily entered into they were aiding to breach. 
After denying first the need and even the possibility of registering and 
assessing debts in the way usual in any domestic insolvency procedure, the IMF 
meanwhile demands specific checks regarding, “for example, the authority of an 
official to borrow on behalf of the debtor,”8 echoing what I first demanded in 
1990, nearly using my wording.9 
The platform of Jubilee 2000 U.K., a British movement founded in 1996, 
demanded the cancellation of unpayable debts. Which debts were to be 
considered payable, or the capacity of debtors to pay, was to be determined by 
an independent arbitration panel. The movement described my insolvency 
proposal emulating Chapter 9 U.S. municipal bankruptcy10 without using the 
word insolvency, which was still considered too revolutionary by quite a few 
participating nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). This fair and transparent 
arbitration process later became the acronym FTAP, a solution for which many 
NGOs have campaigned worldwide. Soon, NGOs started to look into the legal 
and moral bases of debts. They propagated the idea that some claims were 
unfounded or should not be honored. This was not always done with utmost 
legal and logical rigor. Politically, however, it prepared the way for present 
differentiations. Patricia Adams drew attention to the largely forgotten U.S. 
concept of odious debts some fifteen years ago, a concept that was revived by 
the U.S. administration when demanding debt cancellation for post-invasion 
Iraq.11 Once the United States realized what it had done by reviving its own 
odious debt doctrine, the administration started to back-pedal vigorously. The 
 
 6. Kunibert Raffer, Applying Chapter 9 Insolvency to International Debts: An Economically 
Efficient Solution with a Human Face, 18 WORLD DEV. 301, 309 (1990). 
 7. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEBT TABLES, vol.1, at xx (1988). 
 8. IMF, THE DESIGN OF THE SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING MECHANISM—FURTHER 
CONSIDERATIONS 68 (2002), http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrm/2002/112702.pdf. 
 9. Kunibert Raffer, What’s Good for the United States Must Be Good for the World: Advocating 
an International Chapter 9 Insolvency, in FROM CANCÚN TO VIENNA, INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN A NEW WORLD 68 (Bruno Kreisky Forum for International Dialogue ed., 1993), 
available at  http://homepage.univie.ac.at/Kunibert.Raffer/kreisky.pdf. 
 10. See Raffer, supra note 6. 
 11. See PATRICIA ADAMS, ODIOUS DEBTS: LOOSE LENDING, CORRUPTION, AND THE THIRD 
WORLD’S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY (1991). 
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damage of giving credibility to the doctrine was done, though. It could be 
limited only by shunning the very word odious. 
Meanwhile, NGOs advocating solutions to the debt problem have brought 
forward an array of reasons why certain types of debts should not be honored, 
as well as an equally impressive array of expressions and concepts. In 2005, the 
new Norwegian government explicitly expressed the intention to support 
arbitration on illegitimate debts and to “adopt an even more offensive position 
in the international work to reduce the debt burden of poor countries. The UN 
must establish criteria for what can be characterized as illegitimate debt, and 
such debt must be cancelled.”12 The government firmly opposes undue 
conditionality regarding privatization, thus economically unfounded links 
between debt relief and policy actions. Norway “will support the work to set up 
an international debt settlement court that will hear matters concerning 
illegitimate debt.”13 As “debt settlement” can also be understood as payment, it 
should be mentioned that the Norwegian original clearly refers to a court (of 
arbitration or otherwise) to tackle debts. This and the clear demand for 
canceling illegitimate debts make the government’s intentions absolutely clear. 
Norway has adopted a highly proactive role in international efforts to reduce 
the debt burden of poor countries. 
On October 2, 2006, Norway declared that she would cancel claims of 520 
million crowns to five countries, deriving from her Ship Export Campaign 
(1976–1980), which the government classified as a “development policy 
failure.”14 Cancellation is unilateral and, according to the government’s press 
release, unconditional, although the annex specifies conditions in some cases.15 
As a creditor, Norway recognizes a shared responsibility for these debts.16 
Unlike other OECD “donors,” Norway will not record this money as official 
development assistance. It is additional to normal aid.17 For the first time a 
creditor government explicitly recognized part of its claims as improper (the 
government does not use the word “illegitimate”) and acted upon that 
conclusion. 
 
 12. NOR. GOV’T, The Soria Moria Declaration on International Policy (English version) (2005), 
http://www.sv.no/partiet/regjering/regjeringsplattform/kap2engelsk/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2007). 
 13. In the original: “opprettelsen av en gjeldsdomstol for behandling av spørsmål om illegitim gjeld,” 
NOR. GOV’T, Kapittel 2: Internasjonal politikk, http://www.sv.no/partiet/regjering/regjeringsplattform/ 
kap2/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2007). 
 14. Press Release, Utenriksdepartementet (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Cancellation Of Debts 
Resulting From The Norwegian Ship Export Campaign (1976–80) (Oct. 2, 2006) (Nor.), available at 
http://www.odin.dep.no/ud/english/news/news/032171-070886/dok-bn.html. 
 15. Press Release Fact Sheet, Utenriksdepartementet (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Cancellation 
Of Debts Resulting From The Norwegian Ship Export Campaign (1976–80) (Oct. 2, 2006) (Nor.), 
available at http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Reports-programmes-of-action-and-plans/ 
Reports/2006/Cancellation-of-debts-incurred-as-a-result-of-the-Norwegian-Ship-Export-Campaign-
1976-80.html?id=420457. 
 16. Press Release, supra note 14. 
 17. Id. 
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Nevertheless, and although it has been taken up by many NGOs, 
“illegitimate debt” is not yet a well-defined and generally accepted term. It 
must therefore be elaborated and defined. Differences between illegitimate and 
other types of debts, such as odious or legal debts, must be clarified. Finally, the 
relation of these different types of debts with my international debt arbitration 
based upon Chapter 9 in the U.S. bankruptcy code18 is examined. 
II 
DEFINING ILLEGITIMATE DEBT 
Considering the use of the word “illegitimate” by campaigning NGOs, the 
Norwegian government had quite understandably a problem when surveying 
how illegitimate debts had been defined. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
summarizes the problem of several and differing definitions used: 
Non-governmental organizations usually define debt as being “illegitimate” when [] 
1. the debt was incurred by an undemocratic regime[,] 
2. the borrowed funds have been used for what are regarded as morally reprehensible 
purposes (such as the purchase of landmines or the financing of suppressive 
regimes)[,] 
3. repayment is a threat to fundamental human rights[,] 
4. the debt has grown to unmanageable proportions as a result of external factors over 
which the country has no control (e.g. higher market interest rates), and when 
5. debt that was originally commercial is taken over by the government of a debtor 
country (through the triggering of government guarantees). 19 
It then concludes, 
The sum of these criteria for “illegitimacy” is a very finely-meshed net, in fact it is so 
finely meshed that it appears to catch all debt. If all these criteria are accepted 
(including items 4 and 5 above), to advocate canceling “illegitimate debt” may easily 
be seen as a recommendation to cancel all developing countries’ debt. This can hardly 
be regarded as either appropriate or desirable.20 
This conclusion is perfectly right. There is a need to define the term in a 
meaningful way, to determine what, precisely, is to be understood by 
illegitimate debts in order to see how such debts should be treated if accepted 
legal norms prevailed—as they have not done so far in the case of southern 
sovereign debts.21 
 
 18. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901–946 (2000). 
 19. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEBT RELIEF FOR DEVELOPMENT, A PLAN OF ACTION 19 
(2004) (Nor.) (emphasis in original), available at http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/kilde/ud/rap/2004/ 
0225/ddd/pdfv/217380-debtplan.pdf. 
 20. Id. 
 21. The problem of defining odiousness has brought about a tendency to use national legal 
principles as the measuring rod for evaluating the legal quality of sovereign debts in recent literature. 
See Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati & Robert B. Thompson, The Dilemma of Odious Debts, 56 DUKE 
L.J. 1201 (2007); Kunibert Raffer, Risks of Lending and Liability of Lenders, 21 ETHICS & INT’L 
AFFAIRS 85 (March 2007). 
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Apparently the first to attempt a definition, Joseph Hanlon rightly points 
out that the “term ‘illegitimate debt’ seems almost never to have been used in 
legislation or court judgments.”22 Hanlon’s own very broad definition reflects 
the Ministry’s problem that “illegitimate” threatens to cover virtually any 
sovereign developing country debt. He subsumes odious debts, as well as 
lending “[w]here [l]ender [m]isbehavior [m]akes [l]oans [i]llegitimate.”23 His 
illustrative examples include debts that could be categorized as odious (lending 
to oppressive or self-enriching regimes),24 but also the increases in interest rates 
of the 1970s,25 and generally loans made illegitimate by illegitimate conditions 
“even if the purpose of the loan is acceptable and proper.”26 Hanlon extends his 
definition to “loans given where grants would have been more correct.”27 
Whereas “indicated” could at least be explained by economists, the word 
“correct” remains opaque at best. Unacceptable conditions making a loan 
illegitimate would be conditions that “ultimately increase the cost of the debt, 
such as dollar convertibility in Argentina, even if they are accepted by the 
elected government.”28 Strictly applied, Hanlon’s criteria would make a loan 
that is not illegitimate a rare bird indeed.29 
I agree with Hanlon that dictionaries are a good starting point for defining 
this term. Whereas “illegitimate” cannot be found in connection with contracts 
or debts in legal dictionaries, The Oxford English Dictionary defines 
“illegitimate” as “not authorized by law; improper” or “wrongly inferred.”30 
According to Webster’s it means “against the law, illegal,” but also “illogical.”31 
Finally, Collins Cobuild describes illegitimate as “not allowed or approved by 
law or social customs.”32 Briefly put, all three nonspecialist dictionaries subsume 
two kinds of debts under “illegitimate”—illegal debts and debts that violate 
social norms. 
A. Illegal Debts 
These debts (which we may call Type A debts) are debts whose existence 
violates the law or basic legal principles or debts that are legally null and void. 
These would comprise debts incurred in violation of national laws, of 
international law, such as in breach of legal obligations or statutes of 
 
 22. Joseph Hanlon, Defining “Illegitimate Debt”: When Creditors Should Be Liable for Improper 
Loans, in SOVEREIGN DEBT AT THE CROSSROADS 109, 112 (Chris Jochnick & Fraser A. Preston eds., 
2006). 
 23. Id. at 118. 
 24. Id. at 120–24. 
 25. Id. at 118–20. 
 26. Id. at 125. 
 27. Id. at 126. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Hanlon argues more carefully on other occasions. See JOSEPH HANLON, ‘Illegitimate’ Loans: 
Lenders, Not Borrowers, Are Responsible, 27 THIRD WORLD Q. 211 (2006). 
 30. CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 603 (5th ed. 1964). 
 31. MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 360 (1974). 
 32. COLLINS COBUILD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 721 (1990). 
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International Financial Institutions (IFIs), or of universally accepted legal 
principles, especially debts whose servicing violates human rights. What Jeffrey 
Winters called “criminal debts”33 would also be illegal. These are debts 
originating from loans IFIs disbursed to corrupt governments, such as Suharto’s 
in Indonesia, knowing that large parts of these loans would be embezzled. 
There is no doubt that debts that can be serviced only if human rights are 
violated are illegal and thus illegitimate, as quite a few NGOs posit.34 
One principle of law is that debts assumed under pressure—obligations not 
freely entered into—are null and void. No creditor government or IFI has ever 
exercised any pressure when governments in many developing countries had 
been forced to “assume retroactively” losses of private banks and corporations. 
It should be emphasized that these were not initially commercial debts 
voluntarily guaranteed by the government whose guarantees were eventually 
triggered, but debts for which there had never been any government guarantee 
in the first place. 
If  such creditor behavior is a criminal act in a creditor country, the criminal 
code would have to be applied. Yet, creditor governments and IFIs have 
insisted that these illegal debts be “honored.” U.S. legislators were more 
concerned. A bill introduced by Representatives B.A. Morrison and S. Levin 
demanded investigation on the amount of such forced debts and “the extent to 
which the assumption of liability for private loans by such countries was a 
condition imposed by any such banking organization for entering into a 
rescheduling agreement.”35 The bill did not become law. 
B. Debts That Might Be Legal by Strictly Formal Standards, yet Whose 
Existence or Servicing Violates Socially Established Norms 
Often, servicing such debts—that may be called Type B debts for the sake of 
simplicity—cannot be enforced or even expected—it would be somehow 
“illogical” to honor them—unless the debtor is a developing country sovereign. 
To give an illustration: In some European legal systems gambling debts are 
legally existing (if paid they extinguish an obligation and repayment cannot be 
demanded later) but nevertheless not enforceable (payment cannot be enforced 
by the winner-creditor) due to moral considerations reflecting societal 
disapproval of the underlying reason for such debts. By contrast, official 
creditors of sovereign debt have never singled out claims as unenforceable or 
 
 33. See Combating Corruption in the Multilateral Development Banks: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Jeffery Winters, Assoicate Professor of 
Politcal Economy, Northwestern University), available at http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2004/ 
WintersTestimony040513.pdf; see also Kunibert Raffer, International Financial Institutions and 
Financial Accountability, ETHICS & INT’L AFF. (Summer 2004), at 61, 64–65, available at 
http://www.cceia.org/resources/journal/18_2/articles/5019.html/_res/id=sa_File1/5019_EIA_18.2_Raffer_
Article.pdf. 
 34. See, e.g., Jostein Hole Kobbeltvedt, Illegitim å Betale . . ., GJELDSBREVET (Sept. 30, 2001) 
(Nor.), available at http://www.slettgjelda.no/v_bibliotek/1.pdf. 
 35. H.R. Res. 1435 § 4(c)(1)(B), 100th Cong. (1987). 
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void on comparable grounds until Norway’s action. The principle of barring the 
claims of those with unclean hands, ex turpi causa non oritur actio, was turned 
on its head in the case of sovereign developing country debts. 
The distinction between illegal debts and Type B debts is not always very 
clear. The British Money Lenders Act of 1900 enabled courts to reopen any 
money-lending transaction when interest or charges were excessive—the 
transaction harsh and unconscionable or otherwise so unfair that courts of 
equity would give relief. Debtors needed not pay more than what the court 
thought to be fairly due. This Act was replaced by the Consumer Credit Act in 
1974, which made resistance to demands for debt repayment much more 
difficult.36 Nevertheless, in 2005 a couple whose initial debt of £5,750 had 
spiraled to over £380,000 had their debt “wiped out” because the loan 
agreement was unenforceable under this Act. Upholding the county court’s 
decision, the court of appeal declined to say whether it agreed with the judge 
that the loan at an annual percentage rate of 34.9 percent was “extortionate.”37 
Such changes of contracts are generally accepted and universally applied—
basically because of moral standards of what constitutes fairness in debtor–
creditor relations—unless debtors are “Developing Countries.” 
Obviously, odious debts can be subsumed under “illegitimate,” as Hanlon 
and many NGOs have done, although one might discuss in specific cases 
whether as Type A or Type B debts. Lobbying the government—specifically, 
campaigning against debt service originating from ship exports and propagating 
illegitimacy—the Norwegian NGO SLUG perceives “odious debts” as “an old 
term that is not unlike illegitimate debts.”38 The evolution of the doctrine of 
odious debts in international law and its recent acknowledgement and 
corroboration in the case of Iraq would suggest subsuming it under illegal debts. 
Norway’s reasons for debt relief deserve closer analysis. The government’s 
press release explicitly referred to the evaluation of the Ship Export Campaign 
by the Brundtland administration in 1988–1989, “in which the campaign was 
criticized for inadequate needs analyses and risk assessments.”39 The Minister of 
International Development, Erik Solheim, declared, “This campaign 
represented a development policy failure. As a creditor country Norway has a 
shared responsibility for the debts that followed. In canceling these claims 
Norway takes the responsibility for allowing these five countries to terminate 
their remaining repayments on these debts.”40 The press release referred to 
Norway’s Debt Relief Strategy, which—as the then-Minister of International 
Development, Hilde F. Johnson, declared—was 
 
 36. Cf. Raffer, supra note 6, at 310 n.3. 
 37. PHILIP INMAN, Court Cancels Debt That Grew From £6,000 To £380,000, GUARDIAN 
(London), July 28, 2005, at 19, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/story/0,,1537428,00.html 
(last visited Jan. 19, 2007). 
 38. Kjetil G. Abildsnes, Legitime Lover Om Illegitime Lån, GJELDSBREVET, Oct. 2001 (Nor.), 
available at http://www.slettgjelda.no/v_bibliotek/1.pdf. 
 39. Press Release Fact Sheet, supra note 15. 
 40. Press Release, supra note 14. 
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in many ways a reaction to the Norwegian Ship Export Campaign of the 1970s and 
1980s, during which Norwegian business interests overshadowed and dominated 
development policy considerations. I have myself called this campaign a disgrace. I 
stand by what I said. One of my goals is to cancel the debt that was incurred as a result 
of this campaign.”41 
This statement shows Norway’s continuity, as well as Norway’s conviction that 
creditor coresponsibility for—undiplomatically put—credit pushing, is the 
reason for cancellation. This very laudable attitude is sadly missing with all 
other official creditors that have steadfastly refused to apply even generally 
recognized legal standards and principles to developing countries so far. The 
wording “remaining repayments” shows that debt service already paid remains 
unaffected. This recalls the definition of “illegal contract” by the Oxford 
Dictionary of Law as “totally void, but neither party (unless innocent of the 
illegality) can recover back any money paid . . . under it.”42 On the other hand, 
though, no Norwegian or borrower-country law seems to have been breached— 
at least this was not mentioned nor claimed as the reason for cancellation. The 
word “inadequate” used by Norway may, but does not necessarily mean, needs 
analyses done negligently. Thus Norway’s claims clearly fall into Type B, unless 
lack of due diligence by Norway could be raised. Only remaining payments are 
waived on ethical grounds. Economically, creditor and lender thus share the 
financial consequences of these loans—both face their responsibilities. 
Legally and economically, coresponsibility, as understood by Norway, 
reduces these debts but does not cancel them totally. This may contradict the 
demands of quite a few NGOs, but is perfectly in line with Norway’s own debt 
strategy stating that “rich countries clearly have a responsibility for helping to 
relieve the debt burden, but the critics have often omitted to point out the 
responsibility of governments and elites in poor countries for their own 
populations.”43 This may be understood in the way that debtor governments, 
too, have to shoulder their part of responsibility. 
If these debts were recognized as illegal, however, there would be no need 
for canceling, as these remaining debts would be void. Even if they were seen to 
be precisely like gambling debts, debt service could just stop. Logically, no 
conditions could be attached in either case. But Norway attaches conditions, 
although not for all countries. Norway’s ship-export debt will not be canceled in 
Myanmar and Sudan until these countries become eligible for multilateral debt-
relief operations.44 Sierra Leone will not benefit until the country has completed 
its heavily indebted-poor-countries treatment.45 One has to look at the precise 
 
 41. Hilde F. Johnson, Foreword to MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEBT RELIEF FOR 
DEVELOPMENT, A PLAN OF ACTION 4 (2004) (Nor.), available at http://www.dep.no/filarkiv/ 
217380/Debtplan.pdf. 
 42. OXFORD DICTIONARY OF LAW (6th ed. Elizabeth A. Martin & Jonathan Law eds., 2006),  
available at http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=49.e1510 (last 
visited Jan. 19, 2007). 
 43. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 19, at 17. 
 44. Press Release Fact Sheet, supra note 15. 
 45. Id. 
09__RAFFER.DOC 3/14/2008  1:05:41 PM 
230 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 70:221 
wording. Norway did not condition relief on a return to democracy, the respect 
of human rights, or a guarantee that money released from debt service would 
benefit the poor, but on the seal of approval of the BWIs. Recalling the cozy 
relationship between the BWIs and fascist military juntas such as in Chile or 
dictators such as Mobutu and “Baby Doc,” one might conclude that the former 
is definitely different from the latter. Given Norway’s overall policies, it may 
well be that this incongruity was simply not seen and that this formulation was 
meant as a proxy for furthering democracy or protecting human rights. 
The statement that Norway’s unilateral reduction is an act outside the 
cooperative framework of the Paris Club and Norway’s own independent 
initiative would support the interpretation of a certain dissociation from 
multilateral restrictions. However, Norway’s government declared that the 
“unilateral forgiveness of debt in 2007 will be a one-off debt-relief policy 
measure. All future debt forgiveness will be effected through multilaterally 
coordinated debt-relief operations.”46 Thus, no definite step away from 
Norway’s earlier position in her Debtplan occurred: “Efforts will be made to 
cancel the rest in a way that ensures the greatest possible development effect, 
insofar as this is possible within internationally recognized rules.”47 
Obviously, Norway does not plan to exercise the basic right of any creditor 
simply to renounce all rights to debt service because the claim is uniquely her 
property. Future decisions will again depend on whether the BWIs and the 
Paris Club condone such reductions. This makes it difficult to argue that 
Norway’s move may set a precedent. The return to multilateralism is 
unfortunate: both the BWIs and the Paris Club have a sad record of arbitrary 
decisions and have shown a profound disrespect for the rule of law over 
decades, not least by forcing countries to honor “socialized” debts assumed 
under pressure. 
Norway rightly observes, though, that due to “delimitation problems, it is 
extremely difficult to use ‘illegitimacy’ as a reasonable and fair guideline for 
debt relief. If one implication of the illegitimacy debate is that developing 
countries have no responsibility for having taken up loans for ‘illegitimate’ 
purposes, this is a very problematic premise.”48 Naturally, if debts can be 
defined as illegitimate later on the basis of evolutions impossible to predict 
when loans were signed, “this in itself would mean less access to financing and 
more expensive loans, especially for the poorest countries.”49 It would also be 
blatantly unfair to bona fide creditors. Whereas it is well known, not least from 
credit relations, that any legal system protects contracts only if both sides have 
complied with their legal duties, the risk that perfectly legal and legitimate 
contracts might suddenly turn illegitimate is wholly different. A duty of care is 
imposed on lenders. They have to observe professional standards, or investigate 
 
 46. Press Release Fact Sheet, supra note 15. 
 47. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 19, at 13. 
 48. Id. at 20. 
 49. Id. 
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facts, such as whether persons signing for legal entities have the authority to do 
so. Tortious or illegal behavior makes creditors liable to compensate damages 
and may void contracts. Human rights might make perfectly legal claims 
unenforceable, pacta sunt servanda (contracts must be honored), is overruled—
except when it comes to developing countries. But there are limits to creditor 
duties and risks as well. Not all risk can or should simply be shifted onto 
creditors. 
Several NGOs, notably Jubilee South, stretch the concept of illegitimacy to 
cover the bulk of or all of southern sovereign debts. Two assertions in particular 
are problematic, namely, defining debts for projects that failed to deliver 
expected benefits as illegitimate or simply claiming that the principal had been 
repaid already, even several times over, because over time repayments had 
been higher than loans.50 Both are legally and economically untenable. 
By definition, debt service (amortization plus interest) must always be 
greater than the amount borrowed, unless the rate of interest is zero. As 
interest is the capital-market equivalent of rent, whatever amount of interest is 
paid can never be construed to be a repayment. Someone renting a car over 
many months may well end up paying more than the car’s value, and yet the car 
still belongs to the rental agency. Claiming that the principal had been repaid 
already is thus patently invalid. What could be legally convincing is the 
argument of usury, which would justify appropriate reductions in debt service. 
There is no question that illegal debts must not be serviced. No logical 
defense is possible against requesting the application of commonly recognized 
legal principles and the demand of equal treatment of people, whatever their 
passports might be. It is equally impossible to speak in favor of debts violating 
laws, especially laws within creditor countries, including those jurisdictions that 
have usually been stipulated in waivers of immunity. 
It is more difficult when it comes to Type B debts. This does not mean that 
the legitimacy of these debts should not be questioned. Norway’s debt relief 
may eventually bring such a change of attitude about, although chances are slim 
at present, not least due to Norway’s explicit statement that future decisions will 
be made within multilaterally coordinated debt-relief operations. Doing so 
would, however, be much easier and less contentious once illegal debts were 
recognized as such and properly reduced or deleted. 
III 
ODIOUS DEBTS 
Although far from not being contentious, odious debts are arguably the one 
type of debt for which international law accepts that they need or should not be 
honored. Declaring debts as odious has already led to nonpayment in very 
concrete, practical cases. The United States introduced this concept around 
 
 50. Cf. Soren Ambrose, Social Movements and the Policies of Debt Cancellation, 6 CHI. J. OF INT’L 
L. 267, 276–77 (2005) (discussing Jubliee South’s demands). 
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1900. During the peace negotiations after Cuba’s war against her colonial ruler, 
won with strong U.S. support, the United States argued that these debts were 
not only incurred by Spain without Cuban consent, but indeed against the very 
interest and will of Cubans in order to finance repression: such odious debts 
must not be repaid.51 This may be seen as having been influenced by the opinion 
widely held during the nineteenth century, including international tribunals, 
that states were not bound by contracts made by someone without proper 
authority, so-called ultra vires (“beyond powers”) contracts. When Venezuela’s 
President Páez had his consul improperly enter into contracts that fell within 
the legislature’s authority, claims under these contracts were rejected. In the 
typology of the preceding section, these would be illegal debts. After the 1970s, 
such basic legal principles were no longer applied in relations between 
developing nations and OECD-creditor governments, as Argentina’s example 
in particular illustrates. Arguably, official creditors have been too busy 
preaching the rule of law to their debtors to be able to apply it themselves. 
When the Soviet Union repudiated tsarist debts, A.N. Sack wrote his 
seminal work52 on the doctrine of odious debt.  In 1922 Costa Rica refused to 
honor a contract between the former dictator Federico Tinoco and a British oil 
company, a concession granted by him and approved by the Chamber of 
Deputies. The new government repudiated the contract on the grounds that 
those who had entered it had acted ultra vires. It also challenged as odious the 
debts entered into between Tinoco and the Royal Bank of Canada, passing a 
law to renounce them. Arbitration was invoked by Great Britain. Chief Justice 
Taft, of the U.S. Supreme Court, was the sole arbitrator. While finding that 
Tinoco’s government was a legitimate de facto government capable of binding 
the state to international obligations, he determined that the Royal Bank of 
Canada “knew” that the funds in question were to be used for the personal 
expenses of the retiring ruler and his brother. Thus, the bank could not be 
expected to be repaid by Costa Rica.53 If the Royal Bank of Canada had been 
able to prove that its funds had been used for a legitimate government purpose, 
its claim would have been upheld. Comparing this decision with present debt 
management, one cannot help noting differences. 
Costa Rica would have had to honor this obligation if the money had been 
used for state purposes, such as building roads or infrastructure or if the 
creditor could not possibly have known that the money would be embezzled. 
Taft’s decision is in stark contrast to present practice applying neither this 
consideration nor ultra vires. More pithily expressed, sovereign developing 
country borrowers were once treated like any other debtor. Creditors were 
 
 51. See David C. Gray, Devilry, Complicity, and Greed: Transitional Justice and Odious Debt, 70 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137 (Summer 2007); Adam Feibelman, Equitable Subordination, Fraudulent 
Transfer, and Sovereign Debt, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171 (Autumn 2007). 
 52. A.N. SACK, LES EFFETS DES TRANSFORMATIONS DES ÉTATS SUR LEURS DETTES PUBLIQUES 
ET AUTRES OBLIGATIONS FINANCIÈRES (1927), available at http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/ 
publications/dettes_publiques.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2007). 
 53. ADAMS, supra note 11, at 167–69. 
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supposed to exercise due diligence. By these normal standards quite a 
substantial part of present debts would not have become a binding obligation 
on sovereigns. International Financial Institutions financing Mobutu or 
Suharto, fully knowing that large parts of the loans would disappear, would not 
have received full repayments including interest, let alone have been allowed to 
pass as de facto “preferred creditors.” 
After Costa Rica, the notion of odiousness fell into oblivion. It was taken up 
again by the United States after overthrowing Saddam Hussein. Obviously by 
coincidence, Cuba and Iraq were characterized by strong political U.S. interests 
and very low, if any, U.S. claims. The enthusiastic reception of this proposal by 
NGOs apparently made the U.S. government see its argument for debt 
reduction in Iraq in a different light. The word odious is shunned. The Paris 
Club does not use it, which renders the generosity of debt reduction a bit 
difficult to explain. The term cannot be found on the Paris Club’s homepage.54 
Officially, Iraq’s debts were not reduced because of odiousness. A 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report does not mention odiousness as 
the reason for U.S. efforts to achieve debt reduction for Iraq, painting a fairly 
misleading picture.55 It introduces odious debts in the following way: 
Proponents of a doctrine of ‘odious’ debt assert that some of Iraq’s debt’s could 
potentially be classified as non-legitimate under international law since they were 
undertaken during the Hussein regime and that international law should be able to 
expunge these debts. The concept of ‘odious’ debt does not appear to be well 
established in international law.56 
Very clear statements by leading officials of the U.S. administration, such as 
Treasury Secretary John Snow,57 that the Iraqi people “shouldn’t be saddled 
with . . . debts incurred through the regime of the dictator who is now gone” 
have apparently escaped the CRS author’s attention. Nevertheless, he remarks, 
“Under traditional Paris Club guidelines, Iraq’s petroleum and gas reserves 
would render it ineligible for debt relief.”58 
Conspicuously, the pertinent footnotes to the CRS Report quote demand 
applying “Iraqi [t]erms” to other debtors, for instance, a Miami Herald story 
about African pressure to “[r]educe [o]ur [d]ebt [l]ike Iraq’s.”59 In the report, 
the U.S. government’s forceful advocating of odiousness goes completely and 
notably unmentioned as though it had never occurred. Instead, the author 
claims, “the U.S. government has made clear its intention to restructure its Iraqi 
 
 54. See The Paris Club Home Page, http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2007). 
 55. MARTIN A. WEISS, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, IRAQ: PARIS CLUB DEBT RELIEF (2005), 
available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/44019.pdf. 
 56. Id. at 6. 
 57. See Hanlon, supra note 22, at 211 (citing interview on Your World with Neil Cavuto with John 
Snow, U.S. Treasury Secretary (Fox News broadcast Apr. 11, 2003)). 
 58. WEISS, supra note 55, at CRS-4. 
 59. Id. at 16 n.19 (quoting Sudarson Raghavan, African Advocates to U.S.: Reduce Our Debt Like 
Iraq’s, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 20, 2004, at 19A). 
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debt through the Paris Club process, and parallel negotiations with non-Paris 
Club countries in the Middle East and Asia, and Iraq’s private creditors.”60 
Debts have thus been classified as “odious” for two reasons: the money had 
been used to repress people (as in Cuba), or the lender had given loans knowing 
that they would be improperly used. The latter type of odiousness is not 
unknown to national laws obliging creditors not to foster embezzlement and 
unlawful practices. The professional duty of care to their clients would require 
them not to make such loans. Taft thus only applied generally recognized 
domestic principles to a developing country. 
Lending under such conditions might not only have consequences pursuant 
to civil law. The Oxford Dictionary in Law, for instance, defines “aiders,” as a 
specific type of accessory, as “assist[ing] in the performance of a crime either 
before or during . . . its commission.”61 There is a need to “prove that the 
defendant had knowledge that he was assisting the principal in the commission 
of the crime.”62 Providing loans to corrupt officials while knowing that the 
money would disappear would be worth examining in this respect. 
As the debt problem has been with us for so long, statute-of-limitation 
periods might restrict the possibility of civil actions. But there is another big 
problem. Over the decades, loans have been rolled over, and present creditors 
are quite often not the ones that granted the initial and illegal or void loan. 
When defining illegitimate debts, Hanlon tries to get around this problem by 
coining the expression “loan laundering”63 in linguistic association with money 
laundering. He argues that loans “issued for the sole or main purpose of paying 
off an illegitimate debt” are also illegitimate.64 He has a point in observing that 
this would pose no difficulty if loans are simply rolled over by the same creditor. 
He mentions the BWIs, whose rolling-over of loans can indeed be traced, and 
one may argue that the BWIs knew why their new loans were issued. One might 
also argue that bilateral creditors knowingly granted credits in order to allow 
rolling-over. There were, in fact, real financial merry-go-rounds orchestrated to 
allow countries to repay IFIs “in time.” In all other cases it is much more 
difficult if not impossible to prove that the new creditor knew (or should have 
known) what the money was used for. Hanlon tries to get around this problem 
by using fungibility: although loans are given for one specific purpose, they 
release funds that would otherwise have been used for this clearly defined 
purpose. Hanlon thus argues that “because of fungibility, all loans to odious 
regimes and dictators can be classified as odious, even if the ostensible purpose 
was permissible.”65 Obviously, Hanlon advocates no longer lending to such 
 
 60. Id. at 6. 
 61. OXFORD DICTIONARY OF LAW (Elizabeth A. Martin & Jonathan Law eds., 2006), available at 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t49.e161 (last visited Nov. 
5, 2007) (defining  “aid and abet”). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Hanlon, supra note 22, at 117. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 118. 
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regimes, even if loans were demonstrably used for investments in favor of the 
poor.66 
This is a simple but untenable way out. First, what if a regime turns odious 
after borrowing? Would loans be lost? How recognize precisely when that 
change happens? Jayachandran and Kremer offer a solution by proposing to 
empower an independent institution to assess regimes and declare any 
sovereign debt subsequently incurred odious.67 The authors propose various 
options, such as the United Nations’ Security Council, an international judicial 
body, or even the United States alone. If this proposal were adopted—its 
authors seem to harbor doubts about its political implementability—the 
problem of odious debts would cease to exist in practice. Credit markets would 
simply stop lending. Jayachandran and Kremer rightly observe that this could 
restrict dictators’ ability to loot, thus limiting the debt burden on the poor. But 
it does not solve the problem of presently existing debts. 
Applying Hanlon’s proposal to present private creditors would be both 
unfair and unnecessary. Especially small bondholders—say, Italian pensioners 
having bought Argentine bonds on the advice of their banks—have hardly the 
means to check all the legal history of the country’s debts in order to judge 
whether their new money rolls over old, “odious” loans. If they buy bonds from 
their banks or otherwise on the secondary market, their money does not go to 
Argentina, but they are holding the instrument when payment is refused. 
Practically, though, this problem is defused. These investors were compensated 
by the banks that had advised them to invest in Argentine bonds because these 
banks did not provide advice with due diligence. 
IV 
CREDITOR DUTIES, LEGITIMACY, AND THE OBLIGATION TO REPAY 
That inappropriate creditor behavior should or might lead to reducing 
creditor claims has come up repeatedly during the debate on legitimacy. 
Arguably, this is more confusing than helpful. All legal systems already 
establish duties creditors must comply with in order to enjoy full legal 
protection of their contractual rights. Not complying with such duties may give 
rise to damage-compensation payments, which can be effected in the simplest 
way by deducting them from outstanding debt obligations. Establishing and 
enforcing these principles is the duty of governments, regarding both domestic 
and international laws. Whereas the private sector has no further duty but to 
abide by laws passed by others, governments also have the obligation to 
preserve the foundation of the rule of law, including international law, and to 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Seema Jayachandran & Michael Kremer, Odious Debts, in SOVEREIGN DEBT AT THE 
CROSSROADS 215 (Chris Jochnick & Fraser A. Preston eds., 2006). In their early, preliminary paper of 
April 2002, the authors used “illegitimate” and “odious” interchangeably, making no distinction. See 
Seema Jayachandran & Michael Kremer, Odious Debt (working paper 2002), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2002/poverty/mksj.pdf. 
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safeguard human rights. Creditor governments have not done so, but have 
aided and abetted unlawful practices, such as the violation of membership rights 
of debtor countries by IFIs—with consequences such as increased infant 
mortality. So far, fundamental legal principles have not mattered when it has 
come to developing countries and the poorest of the globe. 
What seems particularly worrying is that courts, too, have accommodated 
political wishes, as the U.S judiciary illustrated: after Costa Rica had prevailed 
in a lawsuit, based in part on the assumption that this was consistent with U.S. 
policy,68 the Second Circuit reheard the matter and reversed itself when the 
executive branch, as amicus curiae, clarified that supporting Costa Rica was not 
U.S. policy.69 This reversal occurred despite the court’s own reasoning, based on 
what it had called “principles recognized by all civilized nations.”70 Logically, 
the court’s holding subordinated legal principles to administrative whim: 
executive wishes may change court judgments. Although it was always explicitly 
acknowledged that Costa Rica’s capital controls were effected “in response to 
escalating economic problems,” the court specifically named U.S. “interest in 
maintaining New York’s status as one of the foremost commercial centers in the 
world” as one reason for the final judgment.71 Grave economic problems were 
subordinated to this commercial interest, even though it seems unlikely that a 
different judgment would have done perceptible harm to New York’s standing 
as a financial center. On the contrary, given that judgment, one wonders why 
New York is so frequently the jurisdiction of choice. Whereas it is perfectly 
understandable that creditors wish to avoid national courts, fearing that these 
might not be really independent from their governments and that they would 
prefer courts weighing interests in the way this court did, it is difficult to 
understand why debtors do not insist on neutral jurisdictions where courts are 
not inclined to accommodate their government’s wishes so fully. 
I argue that it is important to differentiate between official and private 
creditors.72 Official creditors largely pushed aside the most essential economic 
principles and the rule of law in sovereign lending after 1970. They established a 
framework violating human rights, destabilizing credit markets, and inflicting 
damage on the poor in particular, but also on private creditors. Delaying a 
solution of the problem of sovereign overindebtedness, official creditors have 
reaped political and economic gains at the cost of human rights and the rule of 
law. The sovereign-debt-restructuring mechanism (SDRM) proves that strong 
 
 68. Allied Bank Int’l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 566 F. Supp. 1440, 1443–44 (S.D.N.Y. 
1983). 
 69. Allied Bank Int’l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 519–520 (2nd Cir. 1985); 
see also UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD), TRADE AND 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1986 142 (1986); Kunibert Raffer, Internationalizing US Municipal Insolvency: 
A Fair, Equitable, and Efficient Way to Overcome a Debt Overhang, 6 CHI. J.INT’L L. 361, 364–65 & 
nn.10, 19 (2005). 
 70. UNCTAD, supra note 69, at 142. 
 71. Allied Bank Int’l, 757 F.2d at 519, 521. 
 72. See Kunibert Raffer, Risks of Lending and Liability of Lenders, 21 ETHICS & INT’L AFFAIRS  
85 (March 2007) (arguing this point).  
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forces within the IMF want to continue as before, even to increase the weight of 
wrong incentives.73  It is a highly self-serving scheme that would confer further 
privileges on the IMF and other IFIs, such as legal exemption for IFI claims, 
which would have a considerable ratchet effect protecting IFIs against the 
market and the rule of law. It would have cost both debtors and the private 
sector dearly. Fortunately, it was voted down. 
All IFIs claim the privilege of absolute immunity from any financial 
responsibility for their own actions, decisions, and omissions. Moreover, in 
contrast to developing countries that feel the economic consequences of 
inadequate implementation of projects and programs, external financial 
agencies have benefited economically from the very disasters they have helped 
create or even created themselves. Claiming the status of preferred creditors—
although they know that they do not have that status, as one can learn at the 
IMF’s own homepage74—and benefiting from the total absence of any financial 
accountability for their decisions, IFIs profit from their own errors and 
negligence at their clients’ expense. IFIs have even profited from violating their 
own statutes and overriding the membership rights of weaker members.75 This 
impunity and gains from crises can be strong incentives to make incorrect 
choices. Developing countries and the poor have remained totally unprotected 
against negligently or even willfully inflicted damage. Even worse, errors and 
negligently done damage tend to increase the importance of IFIs, since damages 
caused by one project or adjustment program call for a new loan to repair them, 
thus increasing IFI income.  In other words, there is an automaticity of “IFI-
flops securing IFI-jobs.”76 
Such perverse outcomes are economically and legally unjustifiable. The 
principle that anyone suffering or alleging to suffer damages due to another’s 
fault or because of another’s failure to observe a purely equitable duty must be 
able to seek redress is firmly established in all OECD countries and indeed is 
one cornerstone of functioning market economies. Knowing that one must pay 
for the damage done by sloppy work or wrong advice if that damage could have 
been avoided by following professional standards serves as a strong incentive to 
improve the quality of products and services. The success of market economies 
 
 73. For details, see Kunibert Raffer, The Present State of the Discussion on Restructuring Sovereign 
Debts: Which Specific Sovereign Insolvency Procedure?, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH INTER-
REGIONAL DEBT MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE AND WADMO CONFERENCE 10–12 NOVEMBER 2003 
69 (UNCTAD ed., 2005), available at http://r0.unctad.org/dmfas/pdfs/raffer.pdf; Kunibert Raffer, The 
IMF’s SDRM—Simply Disastrous Rescheduling Management?, in SOVEREIGN DEBT AT THE 
CROSSROAD 246 (Chris Jochnick & Fraser A. Preston eds., 2006). 
 74. See JAMES M. BOUGHTON, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 
1979–1989 820–21 (2001) (noting this fact); see also Raffer, supra note 39, at 61. 
 75. See generally Kunibert Raffer, The IMF’S SDRM—Simply Disastrous Rescheduling 
Management?, SOVEREIGN DEBT AT THE CROSSROADS 246 (Chris Jochnick & Fraser A. Preston eds., 
2006); Raffer, supra note 69; Raffer, supra note 72. 
 76. Kunibert Raffer, International Financial Institutions and Accountability: The Need for Drastic 
Change, in TRADE, TRANSFERS AND DEVELOPMENT, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 151, 158 (S.M. Murshed & Kunibert Raffer eds., 1993), available at 
http://homepage.univie.ac.at/kunibert.raffer/ifiacc.pdf 
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is based on linking decisions and risks. The absence of such risks triggers 
unjustifiable and wrong behavior. A large amount of multilateral debts has 
been the effect of (grave) negligence by IFIs, but IFIs are not forced to pay for 
the damage their negligence has caused. May one example of many suffice, 
uniquely illustrated by quoting from an official IMF document, the IMF’s 
Independent Evaluation Office’s (IEO) findings on the Fund’s role in 
Argentina, which shows many clear cases of, at best, grave negligence. The 
September 2001 “program was also based on policies that were either known to 
be counterproductive . . . or that had proved to be ‘ineffective and 
unsustainable everywhere they had been tried.’”77 The Fund’s IEO makes it 
clear that this had been known before the program started because this view 
had been “expressed by FAD [the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department] at the 
time.”78 Another “critical error” was the lack of “a clearer understanding of an 
exit strategy in case the chosen strategy did not work.”79 The Fund’s Board of 
Directors supported “a program that Directors viewed as deeply flawed” mainly 
because “no one has proposed a different strategy that, risk adjusted, promises 
a less costly alternative.”80 The “September 2001 augmentation suffered from a 
number of weaknesses in program design, which were evident at the time. If the 
debt were indeed unsustainable, as by then well recognized by IMF staff, the 
program offered no solution to that problem.”81 Any consultant or creditor but 
an IFI would be liable to face appropriate consequences. Any other client’s 
lawyer would have a feast. 
Overwhelming evidence, provided not least by IFIs themselves, shows that 
IFIs force policies on debtors, thus making far-reaching decisions. However, 
even if IFIs only provided consultancy services, there is no reason why the 
liability and financial accountability standards of consultants should not apply. 
Introducing normal professional standards, and equal treatment compared with 
private consultants, would appropriately expose IFIs to the risks involved, while 
preference for IFIs is inequitable and unfair. International Financial Institutions 
do not deny that they give advice as part and parcel of services paid for by 
clients. The IBRD even calls itself the “knowledge bank.” 
Official creditors differ from the private sector when it comes to projects 
that failed to deliver expected benefits. Whereas all creditors are subject to the 
rule of due diligence, public creditors have done more than lend by designing 
and implementing such projects. It should be made clear that the risk that 
projects may fail to deliver expected benefits even though professional 
standards were meticulously observed remains with the borrower or country. 
Whereas private lenders would face problems if fully aware that they were 
 
 77. INDEP. EVALUATION OFFICE OF THE INT’L MONETARY FUND, THE IMF AND ARGENTINA, 
1991–2001 55, available at http://www.imf.org/External/NP/ieo/2004/arg/eng/pdf/report.pdf. 
 78. Id. at n.66. 
 79. Id. at 41. 
 80. Id. at 46. 
 81. Id. at 89. 
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financing a debacle, public lenders acting as consultants in addition to lending 
are allowed to profit from their own grave negligence. 
If consultants fail to respect professional standards or to work properly, they 
can be taken to court. If governments or their agents cause damage by 
negligence, by failing to exercise their duty of care, by not obeying professional 
standards, or by acting unlawfully, governments can be sued by individuals. As 
a general principle, victims have a right to compensation. International 
Financial Institutions, however, can inflict damage with impunity and with 
financial gain. Developing countries and the poor remain unprotected against 
negligently or willfully inflicted damage. 
Worse still, errors and negligent damage tend to increase the importance 
and income of IFIs. No multilateral-debt problem would exist if normal 
accountability, liability standards, and tort laws applied to southern countries. 
But IFI clients have to pay for their consultants’ negligence, which increases 
unpayable debts. They have to carry the costs of decades of negligent debt 
management, of continuously “overoptimistic” forecasts and estimates that 
“proved” initially that no debt overhang existed and served later as the 
justification for insufficient debt reductions prolonging catastrophe. Introducing 
the rule of law and economic sense to IFIs—as intended by their founders—
would reduce sovereign developing country debt drastically. This would also be 
fair to private bona fide creditors. Rather than “bailing in” the private sector, as 
IFIs presently demand, although the private sector has granted more relief than 
IFIs so far, IFIs themselves must eventually face the consequences of their 
actions. 
Most Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) have a statutory obligation 
to grant debt relief, but they chose to violate their own Articles of Agreement. 
Article IV § 7 of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s 
(IBRD) Articles of Agreement, for instance, stipulates the obligation to reduce 
claims in the case of default.82 By contrast, other creditors, notably the private 
sector, have no similar obligation to grant debt relief. Logically, this supports 
the view that the IBRD and other IFIs are meant to grant relief well before 
others, that their statutes legally subordinate multilateral claims. Their task of 
fostering development would explain this decision of their founders. Under 
pressure from private business, the IBRD waived the negative-pledge clause in 
its loans in 1993, which would have guaranteed that no creditor’s claims could 
have preference over the Bank’s.83 If the IBRD had been de jure preferred, 
there would have been no need for such clause, indeed no point in waiving it, as 
legal norms always prevail. By waiving this right, the IBRD acknowledged that 
 
 82. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Articles of Agreement art. IV, § 7, 
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/ibrd-articlesof agreement.pdf. 
 83. CATHERINE CAUFIELD, MASTERS OF ILLUSION 323 (1996); see also Kunibert Raffer, 
Delivering Greater Information and Transparency in Debt Management (June 2005) (paper presented at 
the 5th UNCTAD Inter-Regional Debt Management Conference), available at http://r0.unctad.org/ 
dmfas/pdfs/raffer2.pdf. 
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its claims should not be treated in the same way as private claims, but should be 
subordinated to them. 
A very thorough analysis of IFI-preference in international law by J. Martha 
Rutsel Silvestre concludes that “general international law contains no 
compulsory standard of conduct requiring the preferential treatment of any 
external creditor, including the Fund.”84 She argues that the IMF’s Articles of 
Agreement “contained a provision suggesting that others would have 
preference on the Fund”85 before the Second Amendment of the IMF’s statutes. 
The author refers to Schedule B, paragraph 3, on the calculation of monetary 
reserves on which repurchase obligations were based. It can be argued that the 
exclusion of holdings “transferred or set aside for repayments of loans during 
the subsequent year” from this calculation was done “to give preference in 
repayment to lenders other than the Fund.”86 Silvestre argues that the intent of 
deleting this calculation, and with it schedule B, paragraph 3, from the statutes 
by the Second Amendment “was not to repudiate the underlying thought that it 
was beneficial to encourage bank lending by giving banks and others a 
preference in repayment.”87 Her conclusion is corroborated by the statutes of 
MDBs, as well as by the IMF’s attempts to gain legal preferred creditor status 
via the SDRM. 
Official creditors have inflicted damage on debtors, flouted contractual 
rights and obligations, and even ignored human rights, gaining politically and 
financially from their behavior and using these catastrophes to exert leverage 
with debtor countries. Obviously, pacta non sunt servanda (contracts must not 
be honored) when it comes to the rights of developing  countries, an asymmetry 
destroying the foundations of markets and the rule of law. Eventually, official 
creditor behavior has also increased the losses of the private sector. 
Norway’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs listed “higher market interest rates” 
around 1980 as one NGO argument for illegitimacy of contracts. Clearly, this is 
wrong. But is this usury? It is at least difficult to base the argument of usury on 
the increase of interest levels brought about by the United States around 1980. 
Banks themselves had to pay more as borrowers, passing costs on to their 
borrowers with a spread. This was quickly felt by developing countries because 
variable interest rates had been widely introduced during the 1970s. By 
stipulating a spread over the London Interbank Offer Rate or prime as the rate 
charged to countries, lenders shifted interest-volatility risks onto borrowers. In 
functioning markets, the difference between fixed and variable interest rates 
agreed on in contracts is simply the cost of this risk. Accepting such risk is not 
necessarily against borrowers’ interest. If fixed interest rates had been 
stipulated, lender charges would have had to include specific volatility risks. If 
 
 84. J. Martha Rutsel Silvestre, Preferred Creditor Status Under International Law: The Case of the 
International Monetary Fund, 39 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 801, 825 (1990). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
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the stipulated variable rate is reduced by the costs of providing for interest-rate 
variability (the difference vis-à-vis the fixed interest rate otherwise charged 
equals or is larger than the expectation value of volatility costs), borrowers are 
not worse off. In cash-flow terms they are even more liquid. Whether 
developing countries actually benefited from comparatively lower rates would 
have to be answered by analyzing historical data. A functioning credit market, 
as opposed to sovereign lending, limits the amount of risk creditors can shift 
onto debtors. If interest hikes are too large, debtors are driven insolvent. 
Creditors lose money in spite of shifting risk. This also applies to punitive 
interest rates. If too high, they push debtors into insolvency. 
One may try to argue that spreads might have been too high. But this would 
not be easy. One may agree with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
that the intervention of creditor governments to bail out commercial banks 
“calls into question the justification—the high degree of risk involved . . . for the 
high rate of interest banks charge to developing countries. Thus it is the creditor 
governments, not the banks, which are really bearing the risk.”88 But the losses 
commercial banks eventually had to take after 1989 may in the end have 
justified higher spreads. These losses were compounded by unjustified de facto 
preference IFIs were able to get. 
Creditor duties might go quite far. In order to extract common principles 
from national, domestic laws to transform the theory of the responsibility for 
abusive granting of credit into a general principle of international law, Juan 
Pablo Bohoslavsky surveyed laws and judicial practice in eight countries 
establishing creditor liabilities for loose lending.89  He argues that such “abusive 
credits” should also have consequences in international law and thus be 
applicable in cases of sovereign insolvency. This concept holds lenders liable for 
damages inflicted on other creditors by lending with disregard for the most 
basic principles of risk evaluation, thus hiding the debtor’s real situation and 
postponing the insolvent lender’s crash, thereby increasing other creditors’ 
losses. French, Belgian, and Italian jurisprudence, in particular, have developed 
this concept. Loans granted without following the most elementary prudential 
guidelines in the analysis of credit risk, attempting by such means to obtain an 
unfair advantage over previously existing creditors, should be subordinated to 
those not classified as abusive. Subsequent creditors, in particular those harmed 
by having been induced to make loans because of abusive lending to a party 
that could not or would not repay them, could file claims against the abusive 
lenders generating such false appearance. However, this concept is in a very 
early stage at present. It still needs to be made applicable to cases of sovereign 
insolvency. 
 
 88. S. REP. NO. 95-603, at 29 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2530, 2559. 
 89. Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, Consecuencias Jurídicas Y Económicas Del Crédito Abusivo 
(Especial Referencia Al Endeudamiento Soberano) (2006) (Ph.D thesis, University of Salamanca) (on 
file with author). 
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V 
PERFECTLY LEGAL AND LEGITIMATE DEBTS 
Finally, there are claims that are perfectly legal and legitimate, such as debt 
contracts voluntarily entered into by both parties without any overreaching, 
however subtle. Obviously these debts must be honored. They are the prime 
example of the sanctity of contracts, so often quoted by creditors. 
Even such debts are normally subject to risk. Risk and liability are necessary 
systemic elements of the framework on which markets need to function. Risk is 
the hazard of losing money, even without any fault of the lender. It cannot be 
avoided and exists for both sovereigns and other debtors. External shocks, 
individual catastrophes, or unforeseeable events can change the debtor’s 
circumstances drastically, resulting in losses in spite of every possible precaution 
and state-of-the-art analysis of creditworthiness. Even model creditors may lose 
money if external shocks, such as natural disasters, render debtors insolvent. 
Without any fault of the parties, the terms of the initial contract are changed; 
total repayment becomes unenforceable. On the other hand, wrong creditor 
decisions may increase risk. Economically, risk serves as an incentive carefully 
to assess debtors’ ability to service debts. Errors and negligence in assessment 
bring about losses. 
Usually, debtors have rights too, unless they are sovereigns. Liability is the 
right of victims to receive compensation contingent upon conditions stipulated 
in law, such as negligent actions creating unlawful damage. Domestic liability 
and tort laws serve the purpose of compensating those suffering such damages 
and of deterring such behavior. Internationally, this legal principle that victims 
of unlawfully inflicted damage must be compensated applies equally, and it is 
the duty of governments to safeguard it, not least for economic reasons. Official 
creditors have done the very opposite, totally obstructing it. One may argue 
that liability does not change the terms of contract, but creates a new 
counterclaim of debtors unlawfully hurt by lenders. Economically, though, 
creditors get less than originally stipulated. Net claims diminish. Shifting all 
responsibilities onto debtors—as done in sovereign lending—encourages 
economically and ethically wrong behavior. Over decades public creditors 
attempted to eliminate any lender responsibility. 
Losing money is part and parcel of lending, just as grocers have to face the 
fact that some apples rot before they can be sold. Fees and prices charged to 
clients must accommodate these costs. This is both economically and ethically 
justified. Well-managed lenders will, of course, lose relatively little. Lenders 
unfit for the market may be wiped out by losses. 
Some risk can be avoided. Conscientious scrutiny of borrowers, lending 
limits, or checks on how prior loans were used (stopping further loans if wasted) 
reduce total risk in the lender’s very own interest. Additionally, these 
mechanisms perform important allocative tasks, assuring that money is put to 
good use. Risk makes creditors cautious. It is the main incentive against loose 
lending. 
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This useful role was eliminated in sovereign lending, producing massive 
misallocations of funds. In the context of sovereign syndicated lending, it was 
assumed that countries would always exist, and thus always repay. This idea 
does not, of course, stand scrutiny. The history of sovereign lending from 
countries to U.S. states (which are quasi-sovereign regarding debts, pursuant to 
the U.S. Constitution’s Eleventh Amendment) had proved it wrong well before 
the 1970s. One might note parenthetically that the Eleventh Amendment and 
court decisions based upon it do not preclude the federal government or other 
U.S. states from filing a suit. Foreigners, though, are explicitly barred from 
suing U.S. states. Foreign bondholders circumventing this by suing in state 
courts, such as in Arkansas and Mississippi, won their cases. The states, 
however, simply refused to obey their own courts’ orders to pay.90 
Unfortunately, the effects of wrong perceptions of risk were compounded 
by regulatory authorities in some countries that chose to destabilize 
international credit markets by unhelpful regulations. Tax-deductible, loan-loss 
provisioning, a very efficient stabilizer with negligible costs to taxpayers,91 was 
not allowed to play its useful role outside Western Europe. This fueled the crisis 
in the early 1980s when many U.S. money-center banks were on the brink of 
collapsing while European banks had been able to provision against the crisis. 
Furthermore, this U.S. practice taxes illusory profits. It appears a paradox that 
otherwise anti-tax U.S. corporations have put up with this. 
Even without the slightest fault of bona fide creditors, laws compound losses 
brought about by unavoidable risk. When a debt overhang exists, the right of 
creditors to repayment collides with the principle recognized universally and 
unconditionally (not only in the case of loans) by all civilized legal systems that 
no one must be forced to fulfill contracts if doing so leads to inhumane distress, 
endangers one’s life or health, or violates human dignity. Briefly put: debtors 
cannot be forced to starve their children to be able to pay. Although creditor 
claims are recognized as perfectly legitimate, insolvency exempts resources 
from being seized by bona fide creditors. All decent legal systems make a clear 
choice: human rights, human dignity, and the debtor’s “fresh start” enjoy 
unconditional priority. 
Insolvency procedures deal with claims based on solid and proper legal 
foundations. No insolvency is needed for illegal debts. These are null and void, 
whether the debtor is liquid or insolvent. Demands for canceling apartheid 
debts were therefore based on the odious debt doctrine. Insolvency relief is not 
an act of mercy but of justice and economic reason. This is evident down to 
negligible details such as that “forgive” is not commonly used when insolvency 
procedures reduce debts. It is reserved for developing country debts and sins. 
Debt reduction is a right of all other insolvent debtors—even if they are not 
“deserving, good boys.” Only developing countries have to beg for 
 
 90. William B. English, Understanding the Costs of Sovereign Default: American State Debts in the 
1840s, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 259, 261 (Mar. 1996). 
 91. See Raffer, supra note 72; Raffer, supra note 69, at 377–79. 
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“forgiveness” and are required to prove that they are “good children.” Whereas 
very ancient Roman law literally allowed creditors to cut debtors into easily 
transportable pieces—although only judges, not creditors themselves, had the 
authority to decide—decent and civilized legal systems have not only opted 
against physical dismembering, but also for exempting a certain amount of 
resources to safeguard the human dignity of debtors. 
Insolvency changes contracts substantially. In the United States, general 
unsecured creditors can expect to receive nothing in four out of five bankruptcy 
cases, and they will receive only four to five percent on average, if they get 
anything at all.92 Argentina’s initial offer to her bondholders, paying twenty-five 
percent of face value, though five percentage points below the country’s 
secondary market rate, compares quite favorably. The final terms were a little 
more generous to creditors. Meeting President Bush in January 2004, 
Argentina’s President Kirchner compared its offer to Enron’s paying its 
investors only “[fourteen] cents on the dollar.”93 In both cases the principle that 
contracts must be honored was overruled. Argentina’s offer caused an angry 
outcry. Enron’s payment did not, but this was considered a matter of course. 
Laws may terminate, modify, or permit a party to terminate or modify 
contracts, explicitly allowing unilateral changes of contractual rights. Thus, 11 
U.S.C. § 365(a) empowers the trustee (subject to the court’s approval) to 
“assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.” 
Pursuant to § 365(g) this “constitutes a breach of such contract,” but it is a 
perfectly legalized breach. Injured entities are given a prepetition claim for any 
resulting damages and are treated as prepetition creditors with respect to this 
claim. Considering the statistical distribution of unsecured creditor receipts 
renders an expectation value of about 0.01.94 The law itself annihilates perfectly 
legal claims. In the case of railroad reorganization, 11 U.S.C. § 1165 protects 
public interest “in addition to the interests of the debtor, creditors, and equity 
security holders.”95  Section 1170(a)(2) permits courts to abandon railway lines 
if this is “consistent with the public interest.”96 A public interest in the 
preservation of rail transportation mandates finding a balance between various 
interests, which in economic terms means that creditors may have to lose more 
than without such balancing. By contrast, no creditor government has shown a 
similar public interest in avoiding debt service that increases infant mortality 
within developing countries. 
One fundamental misunderstanding must be clarified, though. Debt 
reduction based on the concept of insolvency is not charity but justice. It means 
 
 92. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization 
Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956, 997 n.239 (2000). 
 93. Eric Helleiner, The Strange Story of Bush and the Argentine Debt Crisis, 26 THIRD WORLD Q. 
951, 956 (2005). 
 94. This calculation is based on Schwarcz’s figures.  See Schwarcz, supra note 92. 
 95. 11 U.S.C. § 1165 (2006). 
 96. 11 U.S.C § 1170(a)(2) (2006). See also 11 U.S.C § 1173(a)(4) (2006) (permitting confirmation of 
railroad reorganization plan only when “consistent with the public interest”). 
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equal treatment of debtors irrespective of passports, nationality, or color. 
Canceling unpayable debts is not “limited to the ‘deserving poor,’” and it is 
definitely not comparable to “Victorian charity,” as Hanlon states for no 
understandable reason. 97 Insolvency protection is a right. This is a fundamental 
difference to which Hanlon is oblivious when accusing the international Jubilee 
campaign of a Victorian “charity consciousness.” To illustrate this with a simple 
example: Even a debtor hitting the insolvency judge in the face would be 
entitled to full debtor protection and his human rights would remain sacred, 
although one should hope that she sends him to jail for quite some time for 
contempt of court. 
VI 
AN ECONOMIST’S CONCLUSION 
Bringing the rule of law to relations between developing countries and 
creditor-OECD governments and abolishing the present discrimination against 
developing countries and their inhabitants is mandatory. Opposing it may carry 
the risks of being accused of accepting or defending the legal equivalent of 
apartheid. Economically, equal treatment of all debtors would abolish a market 
imperfection that has caused huge damages, misallocation of resources, and 
human misery. Acknowledging basic legal principles as well as economic sense 
would avoid the catastrophes present debt management has brought about. 
Introducing universally accepted legal principles would reduce developing 
countries’ debts substantially and improve the functioning of international 
credit markets. Those debts called illegal above (Type A) could and should be 
dealt with immediately. This would reduce the debt burden substantially in 
many cases. Encouraged by the Norwegian example, which is a first step, one 
could also elaborate a closer definition of what precisely constitutes Type B 
debts. Some form of creditor co-responsibility, as argued by Norway, can serve 
as the basis to elaborate a more precise definition. Equity considerations, which 
are well established in Anglo-Saxon legal thinking, may be another starting 
point. Equity is a field of jurisdiction that enables the judiciary to apply 
principles or morals. Once a meaningful international insolvency procedure for 
sovereigns exists, this would no longer be as urgent a task as at present. 
Allowing basic legal principles and economic sense to prevail by 
differentiating debts and introducing creditor liability is also in the interest of 
bona fide creditors, who would lose less or nothing if all debtors were equal 
before the law. As economic facts eventually assert themselves, it must be 
recognized at last that large shares of debts exist merely on paper and cannot be 
recouped. Economically, they are no longer claims but phantoms. If legally 
unfounded claims were eliminated and damage compensation paid in those 
cases in which creditors caused unlawful damages, acting without due diligence, 
 
 97. Hanlon, supra note 22, at 110. 
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bona fide creditors would recoup larger shares of their claims from insolvent 
debtors. 
Let us assume that country A has total debts of 100, but is able to service a 
debt stock of only 50. Country A gets insolvency protection—no doubt a heroic 
assumption, still, when it comes to the debts of developing countries. In this 
case the “haircut” would be 50. If 40 were null and void, A would only have a 
remaining debt stock of 60, of which 10 would still have to go in order to align 
A’s capacity to pay to debt service due. For A this would not really matter: 50 
would go one way or another, although based on very different legal titles. For 
A’s creditors, though, the results differ strongly. In the former case, every 
creditor would receive half her claims. In the latter case, those whose claims are 
voided would receive nothing, while recognized creditors would receive eighty-
three percent of their claims. 
As economic facts eventually assert themselves—what cannot be paid goes 
unpaid—denying the rule of law to debtors has considerable effects on 
creditors, both bona fide creditors, who are unduly discriminated against, and 
other, unduly protected creditors, such as IFIs. Public creditors enforcing or 
supporting the violation of the rule of law also trigger substantial negative 
effects for bona fide creditors. Grave injustice is inflicted if perfectly legal and 
legitimate debts are treated like debts lacking such solid foundation. Classifying 
and differentiating debts may thus arguably be seen as more in the interest of 
bona fide creditors, even though the application of universally recognized legal 
principals would have avoided substantial damage to debtor countries and their 
people. 
If official creditors had not blocked a quick and fair solution over decades, 
total debts would be much lower. Creditors as a group will now have to accept 
larger losses in order to make debtor economies sustainable than would have 
been necessary some twenty-five years ago. As the structure of creditors has 
changed dramatically over the last two decades, each single creditor need not 
necessarily be worse off. Bondholders, practically non-existent in 1982, are now 
an important creditor class in quite a few cases, while banks have been able to 
reduce their exposure, although not without considerable costs, as debt 
reductions of thirty-five or forty-five percent under the “Brady Deals” 
document. Formulations such as “bailing-in the private sector” used by the 
unduly preferred therefore add insult to injury. 
Quite noteworthy distributional effects are exacerbated by IFIs having been 
able to secure a privileged treatment of de facto preferred creditors for 
themselves, mostly in breach of their own constitutions. This undue privilege is 
especially problematic in the case of the poorest countries where multilateral 
claims are substantial percentages of sovereign debts and IFIs have influenced 
economic policies substantially. Unfortunately, official creditors have 
repeatedly attached conditions to debt relief that are not necessarily connected 
to economic necessities and have quite often worsened the crisis. 
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At present, any cancellation is based on arbitrariness; there is no right to it, 
nor are there any rules. It is granted to some countries, not to others, for some 
types of debts, but not for others. Reductions should, of course, be accepted if 
and when granted because getting quickly rid of the debt overhang must have 
priority for debtors. But a new transparent method is needed, based on 
objective, transparent criteria, not on creditors’ whims. It must respect the very 
foundation of the rule of law that one must not be the judge in one’s own cause. 
Debt reduction must be available to any technically insolvent country. Equal 
treatment of all debtors must be secured. 
Determining whether a country is technically insolvent is a thorny problem, 
which can be solved by emulating the solution found domestically. National 
laws give neutral actors the authority to determine whether a debtor’s situation 
warrants starting formal procedures of debt reduction. In domestic cases, courts 
are disinterested actors—neither creditors nor debtors. Internationally, an 
independent body is mandatory, too. My proposal of arbitration based on U.S. 
Chapter 9 (municipal insolvency),98 also called Fair and Transparent Arbitration 
Process by many NGOs, perfectly accommodates this demand. An ad hoc 
arbitration panel established by creditors and debtors in the way usual in 
international law would either have to endorse or reject a debtor’s demand 
immediately on being formed. It would have to reject the debtor’s demand if 
clearly unfounded, denying this debtor any advantage from starting the 
procedure. A neutral entity, not creditors, would and must decide, respecting 
the very foundation of the rule of law. Decisions must be taken in a transparent 
way. Allowing procedures to start would recognize that there is a need to 
discuss debt reduction. Debt sustainability, and thus the specific amount of debt 
reduction needed, or whether any reduction is needed, would emerge from the 
proceedings as in the case of domestic debt reduction procedures. 
If clearly illegal debts, no longer unduly harassed debtors, and the principles 
of tort law were applied, reducing multilateral debts in particular—if my 
sovereign insolvency model were used as the solution to sovereign insolvency—
both bona fide creditors and debtors would be perceptibly better off than at 
present. Identifying such claims and dealing with them properly would make 
solutions much easier. Abolishing unjustified de facto privileges of those official 
creditors that substantially contributed to making crises worse would 
meaningfully contribute to an acceptable and sustainable outcome. Multilateral 
claims, whose very existence violates basic legal principles, would have to go. 
After abolishing the undue discrimination of developing countries and bona 
fide creditors, reinstalled economic mechanisms would again be allowed to play 
their useful and welcome role. 
 
 98. See, e.g.,  Raffer,  supra note 6; Raffer, supra note 69. 
